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This Drief is a reply to the Brief submi 1 tr'd by 
Cross-Il.c"~ponclant, MARION W. BECKSTROM, and is restri ,'ted tc, 
the issues raised in the appeal before the Honorable Court 
between MARION BECKSTROM and VERE BECKSTROM, and not the 
appeal between Cross-Plaintiffs and Appellants, NORMAND D. 
LAUB and BARBARA LAUB, and Cross-Defendants and Respondants 
VERE BECKSTROM and ELIZABETH S. BECKSTROM. 
Plaintiff and Cross-Respondant, MARION BECKSTROM, 
hereinafter sometimes referred to as "MARION", states on page 
5 of his Brief that the Cross-Appellant, VERE BECKSTROM, 
hereinafter sometimes referred to as "VERE", used oxymoronic 
logic in stating in his initial Brief: "It was not until 
MARION had abandoned both the Lewis property and the Hunt 
property that he made any payment whatever on the mortgage 
or on taxes." 
The Court will recognize that the significanceof 
that observation was that MARION did not worry about paying 
any of the mortgage payments while his brother, VERE, was 
doing so. However, since the mortgage was actually on the 
Pine Valley property, which had been used as the security cc 
borrow the money to purchase the Hunt property, and was not 
on the Hunt property when he, MARION, abandoned the Hunt 
property, he was only concerned with making the final mort~'· 
payment for the purpose of preserving the Pine Valley pro~J 
not the Hunt property. 
That was simply one additional circumstanre 
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~vidoncing MARION's abandonmont of the Hunt property. 
Even though he denied that was his only motivation in the 
trial, circumstances are more pursuasive that he was then 
only concerned with preserving the Pine Valley property for 
himself. He was giving up any interest he may have claimed 
in the Hunt property, and he was obviously concerned that 
VERE, under those circumstances, might not continue to pay 
the payments on the Pine Valley mortgage, so he paid the 
final payment on it. 
MARION's Brief, page 5, states that that payment 
was made directly to RODNEY SNOW, the mortgagee of the Hunt 
property. Though SNOW had loaned the money to buy the Hunt 
property, his mortgage, as security for the loan, was on the 
Pine Valley property, not the Hunt property. (Tr. P54, LL2l-26) 
Cross-Appellant is greatly concerned about a 
practice engaged in by Cross-Respondant in his Brief before 
this Court. MARION, in his Brief before this Court often 
cites from depositions of either MARION BECKSTROM or VERE 
BECKSTROM to support statements of alleged fact. However, 
even though the deposition may have been "published" during 
the trial, the only portions thereof that were evidence be-
fore the Trial Court, or for that matter, this Court, were 
those specific items, if any, which were read into the 
record at the trial from the deposition, either over the 
objections of opposing parties, or without objection of the 
-2-
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opposing parties. 
If an entire desposition were simply and arbitrarily 
admitted in its entirety, as evidence in a trial, because 
of the liberal discovery rules applicable to depositions, 
and the customary waiver of all objections, except as to 
the form of the question until the trial, havoc would be 
wreaked upon the rules of evidence insofar as admissibility 
is concerned. 
Cross-Appellant respectfully and strenuously sub-
mits that the liberal and repeated use of citations to 
depositions by the Cross-Respondant in his Brief, is im-
proper and any fact sought to be established by such a 
citation in Cross-Respondant's Brief should be disregarded 
in its entirety by the Court, unless the specific question 
and answer was read into and admitted into the record by the 
Trial Court. Cross-Appellant submits that few, if any, 
questions and answers were read into the trial record, and 
even then, if it were done, the proper citation by Cross-
Respondant should be to the trial record, not the depositioo 
Cross-Appellant submits that Cross-Rcspondant's 
use of great numbers of "facts" not substantiated by ref-
erences to the transcript, but by citation to said 
depositions, tends to taint the entire Brief of Cross-
Respondant. 
Point II of Cross-Respondant's Brief is entitled 
-3-
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"THE TH I AL COURT'S F r:: J< :>iGS ,\RE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD", yet the "recurd" used by Cross-Respondant is not 
the record admitted i.n the trial and lends a sandy foundation 
to the Cross-Respondant's conclusions in the entire Brief, 
and especially sections labelled Point II, Point III and 
Point IV. 
Cross-Appellant is also concerned about the ac-
curacy of many of Cross-Respondant's citations. For example, 
on page 10 of Cross-Respondant's brief, he states that MARION 
and his wife continued to approach VERE with offers (to buy 
the Hunt property) from third parties, but the only credibile 
citation to support that statement is found in the transcript 
on page 38, lines 5-10, that is simply a statement by MARION'S 
wife, wherein she said she had talked with a "Mr. Gardner" 
whom she reported, wanted to buy the property. That is 
hardly the kind of "offer" one might place great dependt.:nce 
upon. 
Cross-Respondant also cites transcript, page 52, 
lines 24-26 as authority for the statement that MARION 
presented offers to purchase the Hunt property to VERE. How-
ever, in reading the transcript, it is evident that that 
~as not the fact at all. Counsel for Cross-Respondant asked 
VERE BECKSTROM if ~!ARION had not told him a JOE ROMERO 
wanted to purchase the Hunt property? VERE's answer was 
clearly that ROMERO was represented to him by MARION as wanting 
-4-
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the "Lewis" property and not the "Hunt" property (See 
transcript, page 52, lines 27-30 and page 53, lines l-15). 
Counsel for MARION BECKSTROM continuously but unsuccessfully 
attempted to badger VERE BECKSTROM into saying the alleged 
offer was for the Hunt property, but he unwaiveringly in-
sisted it was for the Lewis property. Counsel may have 
wanted him to say it was for the Hunt property, but he did 
not do so. 
Cross-Respondant' s Brief also cited the transcript, 
page 77, lines l-4 as support for his assertion that MARION 
had transmitted offers to sell the Hunt property to his 
brother, VERE. As a matter of record, that very citation 
from the transcript refers only to a statement purportedly 
made by MARION that "---he would like to sell the property---
not that he had an offer by anyone to buy it. Cros~-Appel­
lant cites these instances as examples to the Court of the 
unreal iabili ty of some of the citations in Cross-Respondant's 
Brief. They, together with the use of improper citations 
of "evidence", which, in fact, was not admitted in the triaL 
raises grave questions concerning the credibility of the 
Cross-Respondant's Brief. 
The statement previously cited from Cross-Respond-
ant's Brief, that "---MARION and his wife continued to appro' 
VERE with offers from third parties (Cross-Respondant's 
Brief, page 10) turns out to be a single casual telephone 
-5-
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, .Jl from MARION's wife. That statement is both not sub-
stantiated by the record and is misleading. 
Another example of misinterpretation of the record, 
and evidence found therein in Cross-Respondant's Brief, is 
found in the first paragraph of page 12 of his Brief. Cross-
Respondant there states: "Another contradiction in his 
(VERE's) testimony as to the conversation is evidenced by 
the statement in his Affidavit (Affidavit in Opposition to 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, paragraph 11, Record 92). 
~gain, the Cross-Respondant cites a document that was not 
part of the trial transcript or evidence therei~ that the 
conversation wherein MARION disclaimed his interest, took 
place in Pine Valley. Attial, of course, he maintained the 
conversation took place at Pickett's, a store in St. George." 
This observation was intended, of course, to discredit 
VERE BECKSTROM, the witness, who, as the record shows, had 
suffered a stroke (Tr. P63, LLl-8) and was hard of hearing 
(Tr. P42, LL14-19). 
The true facts, as revealed by the record, however, 
are that during the trial VERE BECKSTROM did indeed testify 
that one conversation referred to took place in front of 
Pickett's in St. George, as the Cross-Respondant points out. 
Though the Affidavit referred to by Cross-Respondant is not 
a part of the trial record, Cross-Respondant has referred 
to it in an attempt to discredit VERE. 
-6-
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Equity and justice demand that the issue be 
clarified, and though VERE did state in the Affidavit as 
Cross-Respondant contends, that MARION made a visit to him 
at Pine Valley. It also states in Paragraph 13 thereof as 
follows: 
"13. That thereafter in 1959, Affiant (VERE 
BECKSTROM), while on his way to theCourthouse 
(in St. George) to pay taxes on the Washington 
County property, happened to meet MARION in St. 
George, Utah and asked him to help pay the 
taxes on the Hunt Property in Iron County 
and MARION refused to do so; that Affiant 
said that if the taxes were not paid on the 
property, it would be taken 'by the State' 
and that MARION said, 'Let the State sell 
it, I am not putting anything more into it."' 
That is not a contridiction as the Cross-Respondant represented 
it was, and would lead the Court to believe, but, in fact, 
just the opposite! 
Cross-Respondant's Point III, commencing on page 13 
of his Brief, goes to great lengths to establish that one 
co-tenant cannot normally claim property from his co-tenant 
by adverse possession. He somehow tries to equate that 
principal, even if it is the law, with the estoppel theory 
here urged by Cross-Appellant. He states the acts relied 
on to create an estoppel were insufficient because "they 
(the acts of VERE) were not adverse to MARION's claim or 
interest in the property." (Cross-Respondant's Brief, P. 14. 
LL7-8) That observation is little more than a "Red Herring". 
Cross-Respondant misconstrues the meaning of an 
-7-
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pstoppel. An estoppel does not arise out of the acts or 
words of one claiming the benefit of it. Black's Law 
Dictionary, in defining Equitable Estoppel quotes from Crane 
Co. of Minnesota v. Advance Plumbing & Heating Co., 177 Minn. 
132, 224 N.W., 847, 848 and says: 
"Elements of equitable estoppel are rep-
resentations intentionally made under 
such circumstances as show that [the] 
party making them intended, or might 
reasonably have anticipated, that [the] 
party to whom they are made, or to whom 
they are communicated, will rely and act 
on them as true." 
Thus, the acts in the instant case which are of significance, 
are those acts or statements of MARION's, and not statements 
or acts of VERE's, which were "adverse to MARION's claim or 
interest in the property." 
Adverse possession is not urged by Cross-Appellant 
and is not the theory upon which it urges this Court to 
reverse the Trial Court's decision! 
In support of his attempt to divert the attention of 
the Court from the true issue involved, Cross-Respondant 
cites certain cases: 
Sperry v. Tolley , 114 Utah 303, 199 P 2d 542, cited 
by Cross-Respondant, merely says that the conduct of the parties 
over the years did not evidence an intent to partition the 
premises. This, of course, has no relationship to an Estoppel 
in Pais or Equitable Estoppel as urged upon the Court by 
Cross-Appellant. 
-8-
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Cross-Respondant also cites Chatworthy v. <:::_lyde, 
l Utah 2d 251, 265 P.2d 420, but again, that case deals 
with the princip_al of adverse possession by co-tenants, not 
Equitable Estoppel. The Court, in that case, in fact, held 
contrary to Cross-Respondant 1 s assertion that given proper 
acts showing open notorious and adverse possession by one 
co-tenant against another co-tenant, adverse possession m~ 
apply even to co-tenants. However, again, Cross-Appellant 
is not claiming adverse possession by VERE against MARION. 
Adverse possession has nothing to do with the real 
issue in this case! 
Heiselt v. Heisel t, 10 Utah 2d. , 126, 349 P. 2d J7j 
again cited by Cross-Respondant, merely said that there wu 
not the necessary elements to establish adverse Possession 
between co-tenants. 
Again, on page 16 of Cross-Respondant 1 s Brief,~ 
misconstrues the nature of Equitable Estoppel when he says: 
"Clearly, VERE 1 s continued payment of the taxes is not adve 
to MARION, and does not constitute a basis of estopping 
Mation (sic) from asserting his claim as a co-tenant." 
It is not the act of VERE in paying taxes that 
estops MARION; it is MARION 1 s various statements to VERE tr.. 
he wanted nothing more to do with the property, and would 
soon see the property go to the State (County) on a tax sa> 
as pay any tax on it, and, as supported by his letting Vl~ 
-9-
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pay all the taxes and proceed thereafter as if J,G, \TRE, 
were the sole owner, without any objection or act directed 
to disabuse VERE of that supposition or belief, which caused 
VERE, in reliance thereupon to act to his detriment, and 
which are the acts of estoppel invoked by Cross-Appellant 
in this case. 
The true nature of an Equitable Estoppel is that 
MARION, after he has made statements and done acts calculated, 
and which he knew VERE would rely upon, may not, after that 
reliance, deny them or attempt to retract them. 
Equitable Estoppel has nothing to do with Adverse 
Possession nor or any of Cross-Defendant's other cases cited 
in his section on Point III, Manzy v. Wilson, 131 S.E.2d 389, 
Atlantic Refining Company v. Golson, 127 S02d 341, Bevan v. 
Shelton, 469 P.2d 245 and Fleisher v. Terber, 259 N.Y. 60, 
181 N. E. 14, any more in point than the previous cases. 
Manzy Supra deals with a decedent who had attempted 
to convey to one daughter the entire interest in a parcel of 
land in which he only owned a half interest. The Court held 
the other co-tenant was not "Estopped" from claiming her 
interest in the property simply because a probate of the 
decedent's estate had occurred and she had not objected to the 
probate for a period of seventeen years. Implicit in that 
ruling is the recognition of the fact that she herself had 
done nothing affirmatively to cause the decedent, or the 
-lQ_ 
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dau~hter to whom he had attempted to convey the entire 
parcel, to rely upon her, the co-tenant's, acts. 
The Bevin case Supra deals with a co-tenant, who 
was in possession of the property and failed to pay taxes 
upon it, as was his responsibility, both legally and morally 
according to the Court, thereby allowing the property to be 
put up for sale at a tax sale by the County, then buying it 
himself, in an obvious scheme to deprive his co-tenant of 
his interest in the property. 
The Court said he could not do that, but again, thi' 
was not a case remotely connected with the principal of 
"Equitable Estoppel." 
The Court in the Bevin case did make one sage ob-
servation very applicable to the instant case. Quoting from 
Burnet v. Cole, 193 Okla. 25, 140 P.2d 1015, the Court said: 
"Defendant contends that he owed Plaintiff 
no duty to pay the taxes on the mineral es-
tate. The the right to acquire a tax title 
against another doesnot always rest on the 
question of whether a duty is owed to such 
other person. Defendant at least had a duty 
to pay his own taxes and a question is 
whether he may profit by neglecting his own 
duty." 
In the present case, it would not appear that ~lARlc 
should refuse to pay his taxes, or even a share of them, th~ 
later profit from that refusal, after VERE had paid them. 
The Atlantic Refining case Supra, again simply 
reiterates that one co-tenant cannot divest other co-tPntn!' 
-11-
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by letting property go to a tax sale and then buy it hi· cr·Jf. 
Again, certainly not even close to being in point with the 
current case. 
The Fleischer case, Supra is much related to the 
Bevan and Atlantic cases, except that the scheme used therein 
was to fail to pay the mortgage payments, then buy at the 
foreclosure sale. Certainly that is no more in point with 
the instant case, than the previous cases cited. 
Cross-Respondant's Point IV in his Brief, page 17, 
finally deals with the principal and substantive issue in-
volved in this case, but unfortunately upon a somewhat 
misconstrued or misleading basis. For example, Cross-Respondant, 
on page 17 of his Brief, attempts to draw two distinctions 
therein: 
"1. Estoppel to assert title to realty 
is more difficult to establish than 
estoppel to assert rights under a contract 
not dealing with real estate. 
"2. Estoppel to assert title to realty is 
different than estoppel to divest title to 
realty," 
and then proceeds to state that Cross-Defendant has "entirely 
ignored" these distinctions. 
To support this thesis, Cross-Respondant generalizes 
as to distinction No. 1 above, but cites no authority, then 
cites, to support his distinction No. 2, 31 C.J.S. Estoppel 
150 and 28 Am Jur 2d, "Estoppel and Waiver S81 and proceeds 
tu comment further: 
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"The distinction is between the rights of one 1,1J 0 
has not yet est.ablished a legally recognized interest in 
realty who seeks to assert title, and one who already has 
legally recognized rights in realty from which rights are tc 
be effectually divested." 
The Cross-Respondant, to support that premise, 
quoted from 31 C.J.S., Estoppel sl50, but he skipped over 
the extremely important and significant statement: " .... a 
person may, by his acts or conduct, preclude himself, on 
clear and satisfactory grounds of justice and equity, from 
asserting his title to or interest in land .... " (clearly a 
case of divesting oneself of his title). Cross-Respondant 
quotes a portion of that same section that follows: 
"There is considerable diversity of state-
ment as to whether title to land can be 
divested by an estoppel in pais, some 
decisions declaring broadly that it can 
be so divested or transferred .... On the 
other hand, other decisions hold that title 
to realty cannot be divested or conveyed by 
estoppel." 31 C.J.S. , Estoppel §150 (1964). 
That much of the quotation, as provided by Cross-
Respondant, indeed supports as much as it denigrates the 
principal that title might be divested by an Estoppel in 
Pais, merely noting that Courts have disagreed. However, \Iii 
true impact of that quotation is found in the portion im-
mediately following the last word quoted by Cross-Respondar.· 
which he did not include in his Brief. The omitted portiu~ 
continues on to say: 
-13-
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"However, it has hcen said that whether, 
in StrictneSS Of cpPeCh, a title may be 
'created' by estoppel is a refinement of 
no value in the light of modern equity 
,jurisprudence, for although the title 
does not pass, a conveyance will be de-
creed by a court of equity in accordance 
with the maxim discussed in equity section 
106 that equity considers that done which 
should have beGn done." (Emphasis added) 
In other words, the distinction No. 2, drawn by 
Cross-Respondant, is a "refinement of no value" in the minds 
of the editors of C.J.S. and "in light of modern equity 
jurisprudence." 
In fact, C.J.S. quotes from Nissen v. McCafferty, 
a New York case, 195 N.Y.S. 549 202 App. Div 528 as follows: 
"Estoppel in Pais does not create a tech-
nical title in land. Its effect is to 
preclude the party from denying the effect 
of his statements or admission designed to 
influence, or which have influenced the 
conduct of another, and when so applied, 
it is as actual as a deed from the party 
estopped. " (Emphasis added) 
Cross-Defendant submits that this is the situation 
that exists in the present case. 
Cross-Respondant also cited 28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel 
and Waiver i'Jsl, but does not quote from it. The reason is 
obvious, of course, upon reading that section. 
"Although the courts are inclined to 
be somewhat more reluctant to give 
effect to estoppels when they effect 
It says: 
the title to real estate than in other 
instances, the rule is generally well 
sGttled in the modern law that the title 
to land or real property may pass by an 
-14-
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equitable estoppel, which j~ pffectual 
tota:Ke the tltTe to land frum 0ne person 
and vest it in another where justice re-
quires that such action be done." 
(Emphasis and double emphasis is added). 
This is, of course, just opposite to what the 
Cross-Respondant cited the Section to support! 
That Section in Am Jur goes on to lay down some 
ground rules and parameters, then adds: 
"Occasionally, the question is raised as 
to whether the title to real property 
can be passed by means of an Estoppel in 
Pias, since there is no writing made by 
the person sought to be estopped in such 
cases, and the statute of frauds requires 
some memorandum in writing in connection 
with the transfer of title of real prop-
erty. The prevailing rule is to the ef-
fect that to permit the transfer of 
title by operation of equitable estoppel 
does not contravene the statute, and 
that the legal title may be so trans-
ferred. In other states in which it is 
held that a legal title may be precluded 
by equity from setting up the defense of 
the statute of frauds, and that title may 
pass by operation of an equitable estoppel 
in spite of the statute. In only a few 
jurisdictions bas it ever been held that 
the statute of frauds prevents the passage 
of title by means of the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel." 
Section 82 of the same Am Jur Treatise says: 
"An owner may be stopped to assert his 
title to realty whereby his renunciation 
or disclaimer of title he has induced 
another to believe and act thereon to his 
detriment." 
It cites Thorn v. Thorn, 208 Minn. 461, 294 N.W. 461 
-15-
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li' su]'j'"rt of that enunciation. T!J(,m is also cited by Cross-
·J,J'C ll:.~nt in his initial Brief before this Court. 
The Cross-Respondant cites Blackburn v. Florida 
\\'est Coast Land Development Co., 109 So.2d 413 as an example 
of a court which does not allow title to be divested by 
Estoppel in Pais. The court did, of course, make the state-
ments quoted by Cross-Respondant, but the case was, in 
reality, a case involving a boundary line dispute and did 
not involve a case where one party made affirmative representa-
tions, disclaiming any further claim to the property, upon 
which the other relied as is present in the instant case. 
and therefore, is not truly applicable to this case. 
Cross-Respondant makes much of his distinction 
between "asserting" title and "divesting" title. Cross-
Appellant points out that the two theories are merely opposite 
sides of the same coin. The fact is that if "A" asserts a 
title against "B", who claims title and the court awards it 
to "A", who has asserted a title, the court has divested 
the title from "B". In the present case, if one looks at the 
situation from VERE's standpoint, it may be a case of 
"assertion of title", while from MARION's standpoint, it is 
"divestiture" of title. In either case, the same thing is 
happening. Because he previously represented he was through 
with the property, and wanted nothing more to do with it, 
including paying taxes, etc., and because VERE relied upon 
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that rcprcsc:ntation, VERE is "asserting title" and ~l/\RION 
would be divested of title. And, by the same token, it may 
be said, that now that VERE, relying upon his brother's 
representation, has assumed he owned the property, and has 
attempted to sell it, MARION is now "asserting" his title. 
In reality, the whole argument is an exercise in semantics 
and as C.J.S. Supra noted, the distinction "is a refinement 
of no value ... " 
It should be noted, that if Cross-Respondant in-
sists upon belaboring the "Assertion-Divestiture" distinctio: 
it is in reality, he who is asserting a title. He filed 
suit in the first instance to "assert" his title against 
his brother, VERE! 
Cross-Respondant, in his Brief, takes issue with t1 
Cross-Appellant's citation to Holsteen v. Thompson case, 
169 N.W. 2d 554, and adds an additional portion of the 
Section from 28 Am Jur 2d , "Estoppel and Waiver" ~81, 
quoted in the Holsteen case. 
The portion added by Cross-Respondant commences 
with this statement: 
"Thus, by intentional misrepresentation, 
misleading conduct, or wrongful conceal-
ment, a person may preclude himself from 
asserting his legal title to land or from 
enforcing an encumbrance on, or maintain-
ing an interest in, real estate." 
This addition to the quote from Am Jur 2d only 
strengthens VERE's position. MARION certainly "intcntiona: 
-17-
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r ~''represented" to VERE that he uo longer claimed an interest, 
'trpported by his refusal to pay the taxes, or even his share 
uf the taxes, to keep from losing the property, when in 
fact, he now does claim an interest in the property. His 
former statements and acts must have been misrepresentation. 
The additional portion of Am Jur 2d quoted by 
Cross-Respondant on pages 22 and 23 of his Brief, states in 
general that there must be "fraudulent representation, con-
cealment or such conduct or negligence as will amount to 
fraud in law .... " and that the other party was actually 
misled to his injury. Certainly, these elements are found 
in the instant case. VERE was told by MARION that he had no 
further interest in the property, and "let the State take it." 
VE~E. then, relying on that, continued to put his own time, 
effort and money into it, and ultimately sold it when he 
grew too old to handle it, and is now faced with a damage 
judgment of potentially several thousand dollars by the 
buyer! 
It is true, one must believe VERE's version of the 
key conversation, i.e., the one in St. George, when VERE 
asked MARION to pay or help pay the taxes. But that belief 
is easily supportable. 
MARION himself admitted that he told VERE the 
property was worthless and he couldn't make it, and wasn't 
going to farm it anymore, and didn't want anything to do 
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with it during the com" n~ation at Pine Valley. (Tr. P<:?9 
LLll-15) 
Further, on cross examination by counsel for 
Cross-Plaintiff, NORMAND LAUB, when asked if he had been 
asked by VERE to make a payment on taxes in front of Pickett 
in St. George, MARION admitted he had, but then when furthe 
asked if he had said "let the State take it", he, MARION, 
merely said he could not remember. He did not deny it, 
merely said he couldn't remember. (Tr. P29, LL19-30) 
MARION also admitted he knew the effect of failun 
to pay property taxes, i.e. , that the property may be taken 
and sold for taxes. (Tr. P30 LL-1-13) 
MARION did not directly deny the statement at-
tributed to him when first asked it, only at best that he 
didn't remember it, which of course, is to be expected if hf 
is now to get the property back. On the other hand, VERE 
is very specific that, upon asking MARION to pay the taxes 
due in 1959, MARION said "let the State take it and pay it 
off." VERE was then cut off from adding something additio~: 
in regard thereto by counsel for Cross-Respondant. (Tr. P4S 
LL4-9) (The Court must remember that in 1959 the property 
did not appear to have any value, and may not have had much 
value. It is only in recent years, when land and water ha·., 
so inordinately appreciated, that its value is realized.) 
Again, on cross examination by his own counsel 
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(Cross-Respondant had originally called him as his wirJ1css), 
VERE retold the same conversation unequivocably and with-
out doubt. (TR P64 LL2-5) 
The Trial Court, did not, in fact, make any determi-
nation as to which version of the conversation in front of 
Pickett's in St. George was correct. (See Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law). The Court circumvented the 
necessity of making that determination by refusing to even 
consider the estoppel theory, (TR Pl02 LLl0-20) leaving counsel 
for Cross-Appellant no ground upon which, nor any basis, to 
even argue to the Trial Court the issue of Estoppel in Pais 
or Equitable Estoppel. This, Cross-Respondant, argues was 
reversible error on the part of the Trial Court. 
Cross-Respondant in his Brief, cites cases from 
only three states: Florida, Louisiana and Colorado, which 
he says, do not permit the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel to 
divest record title; and three states: Michigan, Kansas, and 
California, where the doctrine is circumscribed by the re-
quirement that faLserepresentation or fraud must first be 
shown. 
The use of the term "False representation of fraud" 
is significant. What does it mean? 
Thorn v. Thorn, 208 Minn. 461, 294 N.W. 461, cited 
and relied upon heavily in Cross-Appellant's initial Brief, 
contributes an excellent answer to that question: 
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"The vi tal principal i ,, t!1~· c he who by 
his language or conduc~ 1<-:•ds another 
to do what he would not oth0rwise have 
done, shall not subject such person to 
loss or injury by disappointing the ex-
pectations upon which he acts, Such a 
change of position is sternly forbidden. 
It involves fraud and falsehood, and the 
law abhors both. This remedy is always 
to be applied as to promote the ends of 
justice." (Emphasis added) 
The Thorn case, as the Court will nom in Cross-
Appellant's opening Brief, involved one party refusing to 
pay a "mortgage payment", just as MARION has refused to pay 
a "tax payment". 
noted: 
The Court in the Thorn case sagely and succinctly 
"If Plaintiff had done nothing at all with 
respect to the mortgage, which his words 
and conduct showed was his intention, he 
would have lost the land anyway. Instead 
of letting the land go to foreclosure, h€ 
consented to the taking over by Clifford, 
who, relying on his words and conduct which 
continued throughout the period from 1932 
to the commencement of this action, acted 
thereon and changed his position to his 
prejudice." 
The Thorn case sets up almost identical circumstanc 
to the instant case. 
The Cross-Respondant admits there may be some 
jurisdictions which refuse to recognize Equitable Estoppel 
to effect title to real property. Cross-Respondant cites~ 
three, but regardless of the situation in other jurisdictio· 
this appears to be a case of first impression in Utah and 1 
Court has the opportunity to adopt the posit ion, as enunci'. 
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10 case ~upra that " .... This rc 0:,' (Equitable 
Est< 1'1 cJ! : s always to be applied as to prorr,ote the ends of 
justice." 
Cross-Appellant respectfully submits that there is 
sufficient evidence in the record, in spite of the Trail 
Court's attempt to excise from the trial, the issue of 
Equitable Estoppel, to show that MARION did represent to 
VERE (a false and fraudulent representation, if you will) 
that he was divesting himself of interest in the property by 
the conversations he had in Pine Valley in 1959 (Tr P29, LL-
6-15) and in front of Picketts in St. George (Tr P29 LL 19-30; 
Tr P48, LL 409; and Tr P64 LL 2-5). 
Furthermore, Cross-Appellant's version of the 
conversations is corroborated by the vast amounts of mostly 
uncontradicted evidence which shows that MARION acted as 
though that was what he had said, until he discovered that 
VERE had been able to sell the property profitably, and he 
filed this suit to recover half of the property. In addition, 
VERE had been the only productive contributor to acquiring 
and maintaining the property over the 21 or 22 years involved. 
Cross-Appellant submits that this case involves 
the age-old situation of two partners in a business venture 
which at one point appears to be hopeless, and unproductive, 
so one partner abandons it, and leaves the other partner 
high and dry to either lose everything, or pull it out on 
his own. When he does, by industry, hard work and introduction 
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of additional t ,. z·Hl money in the V<~nture, m:~kc·:o it, at 
least not a totally losing venture, the first partner 
suddenly wants back in to share the fruits of the second 
partner's industry, faith and hard work. Unfortunately, 
for the second partner, this business venture involves real 
property which now serves as a trap to snap off the head of 
the industrious partner, if Cross-Respondant is successful 
in this appeal. 
Cross-Appellant respectfully submits that the 
Trial Court's decision should be reversed and it should be 
ordered to enter its Order quieting the entire title in 
VERE BECKSTROM, or such other order as will effect that 
result. 
DATED this day of 
----------' 197; 
J. MacArthur Wright 
Attorney for Cross-Appellant 
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